In this paper, we construct a Cartesian authentication code from subspaces of orthogonal space F (2ν+1) q of odd characteristic and compute its parameters. Assuming that the encoding rules of the transmitter and the receiver are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the probabilities of successful impersonation attack and substitution attack are also computed.
Introduction
We recall some terminology and definitions about authentication codes. For more theory about authentication codes, we would like to refer readers to [1, 4] .
Let S, E and M denote three non-empty finite sets. Let f : S × E → M be a map, the four tuple (S, E, M; f ) is called an authentication code, if (i) the map f : S × E → M is surjective and (ii) for any m ∈ M and e ∈ E, if there is an s ∈ S satisfying f (s, e) = m, then such an s is uniquely determined by the given m and e.
Suppose that (S, E, M; f ) is an authentication code, then S, E, and M are called set of source states, set of encoding rules, and set of messages, respectively and f is called encoding map. The cardinals |S|, |E|, |M| are called size parameters of code. Moreover, if the authentication code satisfies the further requirement that given any message m there is a unique source state s such that m = f (s, e) for every encoding rule e contained in m, then the code is called a Cartesian authentication code.
Authentication codes are used in communication channels where besides the transmitter and the receiver there is an opponent who may play either impersonation attack or substitution attack. By an impersonation attack we mean that the opponent sends a message through the channel to the receiver and hopes the receiver will accept it as authentic, i.e. as a message sent by the transmitter. By a substitution attack we mean that after the opponent intercepts a message sent by the transmitter to the receiver, he sends another message instead and hopes the receiver will accept it as authentic. We denote by P I and P S , respectively, the largest probabilities that could deceive the receiver when he play an impersonation attack and a substitution attack and call them the probability of a successful impersonation attack and of a successful substitution attack, respectively.
H. Wang, C. Xing and R. Safavi-Naini used the rank distance codes to construct some linear authentication codes [7] . Z. Wan constructed authentication codes from unitary space [5] . H. You and Y. Gao constructed some authentication codes from symplectic space [8] . S. Gao constructed two authentication codes from unitary space [3] . R. Feng, L. Hu and J. Kwak gave characterization of authentication codes in terms of bipartite graphs [2] . In this paper, we construct an authentication code from orthogonal spaces over a finite field of odd characteristic. Moreover, assuming that the encoding rules of the transmitter and the receiver are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, we compute its parameters and probability of successful impersonation attack and substitution attack.
Orthogonal Space of Odd Characteristic
Let F q be a finite field of odd characteristic. For a fixed non-square element z of F * q , let
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where
The orthogonal group of degree 2ν + δ over
The vector space F (2ν+δ) q together with the above group action of the orthogonal
. PS 2ν+δ,∆ P is cogredient to one of the following four forms
We say that P is a subspace of type 
It is known that the number of subspaces of type (m, 2r + γ, r, Γ) in F (2ν+δ) q , denoted by N (m, 2r + γ, r, Γ; 2ν + δ, ∆), is given by Theorem 6.26 of [6] .
Two vectors x and y of F (2ν+δ) q are said to be orthogonal with respect to
, we use the symbol P ⊥ to denote the set of vectors which are orthogonal to every vector of P with respect to S 2ν+δ , i.e.
Authentication Code Associated with Subspaces of Orthogonal Space of Odd Characteristic
Construction I In orthogonal space
, ν 2 be a fixed 2-dimensional totally isotropic subspace, P 0 be a fixed subspace of type (m 0 , 2r 0 + 1, r 0 , Γ), and
The source states are subspaces of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ) containing ν 1 , ν 2 in P 0 . The encoding rules are subspaces of type (3, 2, 1) which intersect P 0 at ν 1 , ν 2 and are not orthogonal to ν 2 . The messages are subspaces of type (2r + 2, 2r + 1, r, Γ) which intersect P 0 at subspace of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ), containing ν 1 , ν 2 and not orthogonal to ν 2 . Denote the set of source states, the set of encoding rules, and the set of messages by S, E and M, respectively. Given a source state s and an encoding rule e, the join s + e of the subspaces s and e is regarded as the message into which the source state s is encoded under e.
Lemma 3.1. Construction I yields a Cartesian authentication code.
Proof. Let s be an source state, i.e. s is a subspace Q of type (2r+1, 2(r−1)+1, r− 1, Γ) containing ν 1 , ν 2 in P 0 . Clearly, Q has a matrix representation as follows
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such that
Let e be an encoding rule, i.e. e is a subspace R of type (3, 2, 1) which intersects P 0 at ν 1 , ν 2 and is not orthogonal to ν 2 . Therefore, there exists a u ∈ R such that
Since R is a subspace of type (3, 2, 1), we have 
u is a subspace of type (2r + 2, 2r + 1, r, Γ) and is not orthogonal to ν 2 , and M ∩ P 0 is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ). So M is a message.
Let M ∈ M be a subspace of type (2r + 2, 2r + 1, r, Γ) which intersects P 0 at subspace of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ), containing ν 1 , ν 2 and not orthogonal to ν 2 . Set Q = M ∩ P 0 , then ν 1 , ν 2 ⊂ Q and Q is a subspace of type Let Q be a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ) containing ν 1 , ν 2 and contained in ν 1 , ν 2 ⊥ . We may assume that
(ii) Let P be a subspace of type (m 0 , 2r 0 + 1, r 0 , Γ) containing a fixed subspace of type (2r + 1, 2(r − 1) + 1, r − 1, Γ) containing ν 1 , ν 2 and contained in ν 1 , ν 2 ⊥ .
Since the orthogonal group O 2ν+δ,∆ (F q ) acts transitively on each set of subspaces of the same type, we may assume that P has a matrix representation 
It follows that
P S 2ν+1,∆ P =         P 2 P 1 + P 1 P 2          ,
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where (P 1 , P 2 ) is a subspace of type (m 0 − 2r − 1, 2(r 0 − r + 1), r 0 − r + 1) in F (2(ν−r−1)) . Therefore, n 2 = N (m 0 − 2r − 1, 2(r 0 − r + 1), r 0 − r + 1; 2(ν − r − 1)).
(iii) Similar to the proof of (i), we obtain Counting the number of 1 s in the matrix by rows and columns, respectively, we get |S| · n 3 = n 1 · n 2 . By Lemma 3.2, the lemma holds.
Lemma 3.4. Let E be as in construction I. Then
Proof. |E| is the number of subspaces of type (3, 2, 1) which intersect P 0 at ν 1 , ν 2 and not orthogonal to ν 2 . Set R = ν 1 , ν 2 , u ∈ E, then ν 2 S 2ν+1,∆ u = 0. So we obtain
Therefore, |E| = q 2ν−2 . Since ν 2 S 2ν+1,∆ u = 1, we may assume that 
Since M is a fixed message, a 2 , a 3 , a 5 are fixed. It follows that the number of encoding rules contained in a massage is q 2r−1 . Proof. 
It follows that
where u ∈ R and ν 2 S 2ν+1,∆ u = 1. Clearly, ν 1 , ν 2 , α + u is an encoding rule contained in M 1 ∩ M 2 , where α ∈ Q 0 .
Conversely, let ν 1 , ν 2 , w be an encoding rule contained in M 1 ∩ M 2 , where ν 2 S 2ν+1,∆ w = 1. Write
Since Q 1 ⊕ u and Q 2 ⊕ u are direct sum, we obtain λ 1 = λ 2 = λ. It follows that Assuming now that the encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, let us compute P I and P S . By Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3. Clearly, given any source state Q 1 there is a source state Q 2 such that dim(Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ) = 2r. Hence P S = 1 q . Summarizing, we obtain 
